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Abstract  
With the large potential for increase in installed offshore wind capacities especially at far-offshore 
locations, cooperation and coordination across countries can contribute to a more efficient 
expansion of renewable generation. Locations are often bordering areas between markets with 
different support schemes and rules for market access, market integration (incl. balancing 
responsibility) and development of transmission capacity. Countries that are not coordinating 
activities in such areas might trigger non-optimal connection solutions of wind projects. They 
might also find themselves competing for investment in a market with limited capital available. 
In both cases, the cost-efficiency of the renewable support policies decreases. Current EU 
legislation opens for cooperation mechanisms such as joint support schemes, joint projects and 
statistical transfers.  
We investigate which of the cooperation and coordination possibilities are applicable and 
favourable in the offshore wind context and address the specific barriers for implementing joint 
support schemes. This includes supporting wind generation that is connected to a country 
different from the one that finances the support. More specifically, the benefits and disadvantages 
of tendering schemes, feed-in tariffs, feed-in premiums and quota schemes as joint support 
mechanisms are addressed. We illustrate consequences of possible joint support scheme solutions 
for wind generator revenue and infrastructure cost and draw conclusions regarding the cost-
efficiency of the renewable policy. We discuss the risk implications for investors in wind energy 
and infrastructure projects. Depending on the specific design, an internationally coordinated 
support mechanism may not expose investors to political changes as much as a purely national 
scheme does. Other risks may increase. 
Possible policy solutions are suggested for joint support schemes and joint projects. Furthermore, 
consequences for wind generator revenues and system cost are illustrated. The preliminary 
results point to a considerable potential benefit and there are promising solutions to overcome the 
barriers. For example, implementing a special cross-border offshore zone where a joint support 
scheme could be implemented is a promising option. 
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1. Introduction 
Offshore wind power plays a key role for the deployment of renewable energy sources in a 
number of countries, expressed through the existing National Renewable Action Plans 
(NREAPs). The key challenges for the industry are cost decreases, which are mainly going to be 
achieved with technological development – which itself is fostered by a specified policy 
framework. Namely, this covers support schemes, connection regimes and broader aspects such 
as marine spatial planning. The WINDSPEED project is the latest example for the latter field and 
covers the North Sea (Veum et al., 2011). It extends earlier national approaches where possible 
areas for offshore wind power were designated and may play a role in increasing international 
collaboration in the future. This collaboration can consist of a many different facets, such as joint 
support schemes or joint projects under the EU Directive 2009/28/EC or the internationally 
coordinated connection of offshore wind farms. Ropenus/Grenaa Jensen (2009) provide an 
overview of benefits of collaboration and risk characteristics of single support schemes. 
Roggenkamp et al. (2010) are the first ones to illustrate a number of interesting connection 
constellations such as an offshore wind farm’s connection to another than its home country, or it 
being connected to several countries. Implementing such possibilities can be beneficial, as the 
OffshoreGrid project (de Decker/Kreutzkamp, 2011) quantifies on a large scale. In addition, it 
states examples on benefits through combined connection of neighbouring wind farms and the 
incorporation of wind farms into cables (e.g. the considered CobraCable connection between the 
Netherlands and Denmark, closely touching German offshore wind farms). However, 
implementing such internationally combined solutions leaves a number of regulatory challenges 
such as incentives for the involved transmission system operators and offshore wind farm 
operators. If several neighbouring offshore wind farms with different national affiliations are to 
share transmission connections, a homogeneous policy framework may facilitate a number of 
issues: similar support scheme levels for one site are likely to be efficient, and useful connection 
responsibilities can facilitate the integration of the site’s generation in an economic way. 
 
This paper addresses a number of these issues: its starting point is the current EU legislation on 
national renewable targets as well as on support schemes. We illustrate how these could be 
combined before turning towards possible barriers for implementation. Drawing on the 
previously discussed combination of policy schemes, we illustrate possibilities to overcome these 
barriers for 2 specific cases, namely for a tendering scheme for cross-border areas as well as for a 
tradable green certificate scheme for a larger geographic area. A risk evaluation for the involved 
actor follows before turning towards the discussion and conclusions. 
2. EU legislation 
The current EU legislation on renewable energy is dominated by EU Directive 2009/28/EC. For 
the first time, national targets for renewable energy have become binding. For each member state 
of the European Union, a 2020 target for the share of renewable energy in the final energy 
consumptions has been set, so that the average RES share over all countries will be 20% in 2020. 
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The specific target of each country is determined as required increase from the individual 2005 
levels and a combination of few parameters, amongst them differences in income level.  
 
Figure 1: Binding RES targets for EU member states in 2020, as percentage of final energy consumption 
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Source: own illustration, data from Directive 2009/28/EC 
 
The differences in costs of RES production in the different countries have not been directly 
included in setting the targets. In some member states, the required investment in RES might be 
significantly more costly than in other member states. Therefore, there exist potential benefits 
from cooperation and joint implementation of national targets. This would reduce the overall 
compliance costs of the RES targets. 
 
The EU Directive 2009/28/EC has opened up for a joint compliance with the individual targets 
through the utilisation of so-called cooperation mechanisms. Between EU member states, three 
cooperation options are defined:  
• Statistical transfers of target accounting units of RES production from one country with 
‘over-compliance’ to a country undersupplied with RES production 
• Joint projects amongst EU member states, with a contractual arrangement between the 
participating countries on how to allocate the units of RES production accounting for 
target compliance 
• Joint support schemes amongst EU member states, with a jointly implemented support 
in both countries and a contractual arrangement on how to allocate the target accounting 
units of RES production 
 
The details for the specific implementation of these mechanisms have not been laid out yet. 
 
As part of the monitoring process demanded in (Directive 2009/28/EC 2009), every EU member 
state has published their pathway on how to achieve their national RES target in form of a 
National Renewable Energy Action Plan (NREAP). This happened between July 2010 and 
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January 2011 (Beurskens/Hekkenberg 2011, p. 28). Currently, six EU member states have 
integrated the use of cooperation mechanisms in their NREAPs on quantitative basis. In total, the 
expected cross-border trade accounts for the very limited amount of ca. 0,4% of the expected EU 
renewables production in 2020 (own data analysis based on EC 2011). 
 
The theoretical potential for statistical transfers is large, but only in a perfect market where all 
governments act strictly economically rational, do not exhibit risk-avoiding behaviour and have 
perfect foresight. In this case, those countries with future over-compliance could commit to 
statistical transfers sufficiently many years ahead. In practice, this might be for both the selling 
and the receiving party a too risky strategy to follow cost-efficiently (Jansen et al., 2011). 
Therefore, it is expected, for example by Klessmann et al. (2010) that statistical transfers will be 
used more or less as an opportunistic measure of straighten out arising short and long positions 
of renewable energy production towards 2020 rather than as a strategic measure with significant 
trading volume.  
 
The mechanism of joint projects gives member states the opportunity to develop projects outside 
their own borders if they enter into a project-specific or framework agreement with the member 
state hosting the projects. An advantage of joint projects is that less expensive RES solutions can 
be pursued by one country without having to agree on a joint support with the hosting country 
and without joint changes in regulation. A disadvantage is the potentially high transaction and 
administrative cost of establishing this measure on a project-by-project basis. 
 
Joint support schemes can be established between member states who want to join forces in 
developing renewable energies. This joint support scheme can be designed for whole systems, a 
limited geographic area or limited to specific technologies. A well-designed joint support scheme 
is expected to require a large preparation and implementation effort. Agreements for the 
allocation of the eligible RES production are required, as well as the establishment of a common 
support fund and the amendment of national regulations. Joint support schemes are on the other 
hand the most promising mechanism from a strategic cooperation perspective, since they can 
involve significantly more RES production than joint projects. The joint support schemes will 
also be significantly better rooted in both member states’ RES support and regulatory systems 
which diminish uncertainty. 
 
Joint support schemes have to be based on a jointly agreed policy type. The most commonly 
used RES support policies are Feed-in tariffs (FIT), which are guaranteed prices, Feed-in 
premiums (FIP), which are guaranteed add-ons to market prices, and quota obligations systems 
with Tradable Green Certificates (TGC). Mostly for technologies with typically large installation 
sizes, such as offshore wind parks, Tendering processes are used to determine a cost-efficient, 
project-specific guaranteed feed-in tariff or comparable price premium scheme. 
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3. Barriers 
EU member states will engage in cooperating on joint support schemes if they all benefit from it. 
A mutually beneficial situation can be achieved if the overall benefits are greater than the overall 
cost and if the costs and benefits can be distributed in a fair way. The challenge to design this fair 
distribution is probably the main barrier but that is because it has to deal with several effects 
arising from support schemes, power markets and infrastructure. 
 
Klessmann (2009) describes the different elements of costs and benefits for each MS under a 
cooperation mechanism: The direct costs are the primary support cost for the produced RES 
electricity (i.e. Feed-in premiums). The direct benefit is the contribution to RES target 
compliance. There are also a number of indirect costs and benefits that must be addressed such 
as RES integration cost, effect on power prices, conventional generator income, employment and 
security of supply. Difficulties in quantifying these indirect costs and benefits may lead to certain 
barriers for the implementation of cooperation mechanisms. In some situations the secondary 
benefits will fall entirely on the country expanding its RES capacity and this could be effectively 
hindering the cooperation.  
 
Especially local benefits (jobs, security, innovation, export options) are often mentioned as a 
significant element by political decision makers and they therefore form a barrier if they only 
affect one of the countries engaging in cooperation. The compensation for such indirect losses is 
very hard to quantify into a price premium on the RES-certificate transfer price.  
Barriers also include the influence on domestic/regional power market prices. One market will be 
influenced by for example wind expansion with lower prices that will affect existing 
conventional producers. Supporting that development will be opposed by producers whereas 
consumers will support such a strategy. However, the investment will be influenced by decisions 
of producers and the option of securing connection to other markets with higher market prices 
could reduce the price decrease caused by adding capacity to the market.   
Different RES support systems 
There are considerable barriers related to difference in support system between countries, but just 
as important is the barrier from different levels of support. 
 
Support system differences covers combinations of: feed-in tariffs, feed-in premiums, green 
certificates or tendering(auctions) and differences in the coverage of technologies with 
technology banding or technology specific support level. 
 
Support levels create barriers as they are expressing the willingness of the 
population/government to pay for renewable expansion. Offshore wind support has been granted 
at quite different levels in neighbouring countries around the North Sea. The result is that 
investors have been moving to the areas of highest expected revenues mainly in the form of 
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support. In a joint support scheme, the investors in the high support level market would oppose 
to a joint system as well as those that have to finance more RES expansion at higher costs (power 
consumers) in the low support level country might oppose to the joint system as well. Renewable 
industry, green development supporters and renewable investors in the high support level 
country would all oppose to the reduction of support levels despite that cooperation support can 
be reduced because cheaper options can be exploited and RES expansion in total would be at 
least the same. 
Power market regulation, composition and price levels 
Network regulation varies a great deal between member states from rate of return to incentive 
based price and revenue caps. The details in incentive regulation include numerous differences 
and the enforcement of regulation is not always effective. Network regulation assures incentives 
for networks to facilitate efficient connection of new technologies and network reinforcement 
(Ropenus et al., 2011). If national regulation allow networks to include reinforcement 
investments caused by renewable generation in their capital base and thereby revenue cap this 
cost will be borne by the network customers. In the case of a cooperation country receiving the 
RES credits the host country will require the receiving country to compensate also this cost, but 
the transfer to network customers seem very difficult to realise. 
 
Power markets differ even though they are in many cases coupled and therefore prices to some 
extent are correlated.  Differences in market concentration and technology composition create 
some barriers. The mix of technologies in power generation can be more or less flexible to adjust 
to short term changes in renewable generation. It can be an important barrier for increasing the 
renewable capacity in a country if the inflexibility of the generation capacity is combined with 
exposition to the power market price level and volatility differs and creates additional barriers. 
Price levels in some countries will not be affected very much from increasing or decreasing the 
renewable expansion. However countries where renewable expansion potentials are abundant 
and cheap could experience considerable changes in power prices and corresponding 
deterioration in profitability of existing conventional and renewable capacity. It is not necessarily 
easy to compensate the firms/producers that lose with the gain experienced by the consumers in 
terms of lower prices. At the same time the country facing the reduced prices will probably have 
to look for alternative ways of providing incentives for future investment in conventional 
capacity.     
 
Generation mix might be quite substantially influenced by intensively exploiting one cheap 
renewable resource: first, expanding the technology itself and second, the general power price 
effect (reduced for low marginal costs RES as referred above) which makes the least efficient 
base load plants less profitable or even loss making. The generation mix might then be affected 
in a direction that is providing less security of supply for power and makes the sector more 
vulnerable to change in few or just one fuel price as natural gas. 
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Table 1 gives an overview of the main benefits and disadvantages of regulatory combinations and 
is based on the following assumptions: 
• Statistical transfers do not require a support integration of the participating countries 
because the transfer takes place at a higher institutional level, i.e. between countries. One 
of the main issues in this context is to choose the pricing mechanism for the transfer (for 
an overview of different options, see e.g. Klessmann et al. (2010)). 
• Joint projects refer to a narrowly defined offshore wind energy project in a specific 
geographic area. Participating countries, their current support schemes and levels as well 
as the quantity target to be met are defined in advance. 
• Joint support schemes are considered for a larger geographic area and thus, potentially 
contain multiple projects. As for joint projects, participating countries, their current 
support schemes and levels as well as the quantity target to be met are defined in 
advance. 
 
The main criterion of international policy collaboration for meeting national RES targets is that a 
certain quantity is met. Offshore wind energy is today supported by tendering schemes (e.g. 
Denmark), feed-in tariffs (e.g. Germany) or quota mechanisms (e.g. United Kingdom). In 
addition, quota mechanisms seem the natural approach for internationally harmonised schemes 
with a focus on efficiency: Norway and Sweden implement a technology-neutral TGC scheme 
from 2012 onwards and a quota scheme (Guarantees of Origin) has for a long time dominated the 
discussion about a possible harmonised European support scheme. Based on these 
considerations, we choose to focus on two options that seem to have most practical relevance for 
our further analysis: a) a tendering solution for a joint project and b) a TGC scheme as a joint 
support scheme for a larger area. For both, we assume that they are technology-specific for 
offshore wind power and that the support is the only attainable support within the given 
geographic area. In other words, the combination of location and technology is exempt from the 
applying national support scheme to avoid undesirable effects from overlapping schemes. 
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Table 1: Combinations of cooperation schemes and support schemes - main benefits and disadvantages 
 
  Statistical transfers Joint projects Joint support scheme
Feed‐in tariff, 
price premium 
• Ex‐post tool ‘above’ national 
support schemes 
• Pricing / burden sharing 
• Costs of total period 
represented in transfer for 
2020 only 
• Penalty for non‐compliance 
• Attractive  if  support 
level  lower  than  the 
level  of  the  country 
financing the project 
• Resulting  quantity 
unknown 
• Attractive  if  joint  level 
lower  than  participating 
countries’ levels 
• Resulting  quantity 
unknown 
• Geographical 
distribution  of  projects 
and  related  national 
affiliation  uncertain  in 
advance 
Tendering  • Narrowly  defined 
conditions 
• Quantity  target  set, 
price  results  from 
competition 
• Quantity  target  set, 
price  results  from 
competition 
• Geographical 
distribution  of  projects 
and  related  national 
affiliation  uncertain  in 
advance  (network 
connection difficult) 
Tradable  Green 
Certificates 
• If specifically established 
for  the  joint  projects, 
then  market  liquidity 
too low 
• If  integrated  into  the 
existing  system  of  the 
financing  country,  then 
market  distortion 
problem 
• Quantity  target  set, 
price  results  from 
competition 
• Geographical 
distribution  of  projects 
and  related  national 
affiliation  uncertain  in 
advance  (network 
connection difficult) 
• Steadily  rising  quota 
demand  provides  a 
reasonable  market  size 
for the industry 
 
4. Case studies 
Based on the above discussed considerations, we have investigated two specific cases, one on 
joint projects involving a tendering scheme, and a second one on a joint support scheme 
involving a quota obligation with tradable green certificates specifically established for the 
defined area. 
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4.1 Case 1: Joint projects – tendering for specific locations 
The main properties of this case are that two countries engage in a common project at a narrowly 
defined location. A specific amount of wind energy is to be installed in this location and a 
tendering mechanism is chosen as support scheme. The tendering design follows the Danish 
design: the contract is awarded to the bidder requiring the lowest support level, a guaranteed 
price per MWh. However, this is not a simple feed-in tariff where daily operations are 
administered by a third party, but a variable price premium filling the gap between the average 
power market price over a period of 3 months and the awarded tendering price level. For 
everyday operations, the offshore wind farm operator is himself responsible of forecasting and 
selling the generation as well as managing imbalances. We assume furthermore that the joint 
project is physically connected to one of the contract states in a first step. Thus, the other 
contract state participates only via the support mechanism. Figure 2 illustrates the joint project 
solution between two countries in comparison with a standard national solution. 
 
 
Figure 2: Standard national solution (above) and possible outcome under a joint project (below) 
 
For the country supporting cheaper RES generation sited abroad, the expectable benefits due to a 
better wind site with possibly shallower water and closer to shore are quite straightforward. 
Opportunity cost of building an inland project is the main benchmark indicator. For the country 
to which the connection is established, the following cost and benefit elements are relevant and 
may be subject to the intergovernmental project contract: 
• increase in interconnection investment 
• increase in national grid reinforcement costs 
• increased reserves costs 
• merit-order-effect lowering power prices 
• site blocking for possible future extensions/meeting future national targets 
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In addition, the share of additional benefits as employment effects during construction as well as 
operation and maintenance of the offshore wind farm may change between countries due to the 
different siting. Another aspect that has not been highlighted above is the risk of transmission 
failures over longer time periods. Regarding this, the regulatory incentives of the connecting 
country become crucial. It needs to be agreed whether this risk of transmission failure is to be 
shared among countries or whether the transmission operator has to compensate the offshore 
wind farm as well as the involved countries for foregone benefits.  
 
It is inherent to the system that making available sites for third-country access blocks these sites 
for a later national development. In other words, if binding targets are agreed e.g. for 2030, the 
most favourable locations will be blocked already. This risk aspect may also be reflected in the 
contractual agreement between countries. 
 
The OffshoreGrid project (de Decker/Kreutzkamp, 2011) has shown that combined connection 
solutions are beneficial even if one of the wind farms gets delayed by several years. We estimate 
that the increase in offshore connection cable investment can be quantified fairly easily, but that 
building larger transmission connections due to the possible later connection of additional wind 
farms (for joint projects) may be difficult to negotiate due to sunk-cost characteristics. In contrast 
to that, the increase in national grid reinforcement costs and increased reserve procurement costs 
as well as  the merit-order effect are harder, if not impossible, to quantify. The difficulty with 
regard to the merit-order effect arises from its ex-post character: in a stable system, it can be 
assessed from an ex-post point of view. However, taking investments over a longer time into 
account, the extension of RES generation has an effect on the composition of the power plant 
portfolio and alters the merit order curve (Wissen/Nicolosi, 2007).  
 
Finally, an important aspect that has not been covered in the literature until now is the security of 
supply property for a certain price level that is inherent to tendering/FIT mechanisms: if an the 
income level for a share of national generation is guaranteed, this absorbs customers partially 
from fossil fuel price fluctuations. When tendering a wind park based on a guaranteed income 
level composed of the market price and the premium, the customers pay this fixed level. If power 
market prices rise, the premium is reduced accordingly and vice versa. This provides security of 
supply characteristics to customers: the wind park’s share of electricity generation in the national 
generation portfolio comes at a guaranteed price. Under the novel situation of tendering a wind 
park connected to another country, this characteristic trait of the support scheme is lost. Fossil 
fuel prices in both countries correlate, but depending on the countries’ generation structures, they 
are more or less prone to these fluctuations. Let us assume that a country has a high dependency 
on fossil fuels and both fuel and electricity prices rise. The country supports an extraterritorial 
wind farm under a guaranteed price support scheme. The wind farm is connected to a country 
that is less exposed to the price increases, which is why the premium stays relatively high. Thus, 
EWEA Offshore Conference 2011, Amsterdam    10 
 
the country’s electricity consumers are subject to both the higher power prices and the high 
support. Of course, this mechanism can also work vice versa. 
4.2 Case 2: Joint Support Schemes – Tradable Green Certificates 
for a larger area 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Possible setup in an offshore-TGC scheme of four countries 
 
Figure 3 displays the possible outcome under a TGC scheme between the countries A-D. In this 
example, resulting offshore wind farms are only built in the sectors of the countries A and C. The 
idea of a TGC scheme between several countries has e.g. been addressed in Grenaa Jensen and 
Morthorst (2007). Their main points are that in comparison to national schemes, distortions in 
the conventional power sector can lead to higher CO2 emissions. In addition, it can be expected 
that a common TGC market works best if other market structures such as the power market are 
already integrated. This condition is fulfilled for the Swedish-Norwegian market to be 
established from 2012 onwards. 
 
Regarding the case put forward here, two crucial differences are that firstly, a technology-
specific TGC scheme is in the focus of the discussion. Secondly, countries with neighbouring 
offshore areas do not necessarily share onshore borders as well, which is a traditional 
prerequisite for integrated power markets. Existing offshore HVDC connections have a rather 
low capacity in relation to total market sizes. Permission procedures and other administrative 
burdens do not have to be identical between countries, but should have similar procedures and 
time horizons to ensure that they do not deteriorate investment decisions. 
 
It is an obvious benefit that offshore wind parks are a large-scale technology with professional 
participants only. Transaction costs can for this reason expected to be low. Market liquidity may 
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however be an issue during the start phase of such a support scheme. Furthermore, the erection 
of offshore wind parks and respective transmission lines has some bulk characteristics. This 
feature is not fully compatible with increasing the quota demand steadily. A centrally 
coordinated approach allows harvesting gains from combined transmission connection that 
account for a considerable share of total cost (de Decker/Kreutzkamp, 2011). A quota banking 
permission may help to partially overcome the bulk characteristics, but not the 
siting/transmission coordination issue. 
5.  Discussion and conclusions 
Support policies that utilise cooperation potentials and are integrating several countries would 
immanently lead to a more efficient deployment, i.e. of the best wind resources first. In other 
words, a stronger clustering than under the current national approach can be expected. This 
benefit should be put into perspective relative to the possible benefits of large-scale spatial 
levelling: a comparatively even geographic distribution of fluctuating generation leads to less 
total output variations than a local clustering. A number of the presented considerations will gain 
more relevance if post-2020 renewable energy goals are agreed upon because the choice of far-
offshore locations by several countries can lead to more collaboration opportunities. 
Accordingly, ensuring the flow of the offshore wind power towards the country with highest 
power prices may be more deciding than low transmission investment cost. When establishing 
joint projects or joint support schemes, it should be encouraged to consider alternative 
connection options other than to the national affiliation of the offshore sector. An 
intergovernmental agreement seems an ideal opportunity to foster the least-cost connection into 
planned interconnectors and/or to high-price markets. Joint mechanisms require a political 
agreement where price or quantity targets are set. In order to increase planning and investment 
security, it is important that the agreed prices and quantities constitute firm commitments with 
liabilities for all participating countries. It would be devastating for the cooperation between the 
countries and therewith the overall wind deployment if political changes in one country could 
unilaterally affect the functioning of the joint mechanism.  We advocate therefore binding 
international contracts without opt-out clauses. Changes and renegotiations of the joint 
mechanism should always be a matter of unanimous decisions by all participating parties. Even 
national measures that could possibly effect the functioning of the joint mechanism, such as 
connection charges, should be subject to agreement between participating parties, especially 
whenever changes are considered. Under both regarded cases discussed in this paper, it seems 
beneficial if governmental bodies are in charge of marine spatial planning and the first steps of 
site assessments, e.g. with regard to environmental constraints. This ensures that only a smaller 
number of sites is considered, which is beneficial for infrastructure cost. Here, the two regarded 
combinations exhibit different characteristics: for the tendering mechanism, the necessary grid 
connection can be planned quite precisely and the generation of the joint project could be 
considered reliably also as a part of a larger infrastructure, e.g. an offshore grid. Under a tradable 
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green certificate scheme, however, neither the locations nor the timing of expectable installations 
are known. This can be expected to increase infrastructure cost considerably. 
 
In conclusion, the new cooperation schemes facilitate a more efficient attainment of EU RES 
targets for 2020. Statistical transfers are the option that requires least coordination between 
national policy schemes but at the same time being the option that offers the least security for 
RES development. By contrast, the analysed technology-specific cases of a) tendering 
mechanism for a joint project and b) quota mechanism as a joint support scheme call for a firmer 
and more detailed integration of national approaches. Both have the potential to be beneficial, 
especially if the above outlined criteria are followed. In the comparatively short time until 2020, 
it seems more realistic to coordinate joint projects based on tendering than to setup a quota 
scheme. The latter may however become a more relevant long-term option if post-2020 targets 
are defined. 
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